“La [otra] mitad del conocimiento”: John Dewey, Michael Oakeshott y críticas paralelas del racionalismo en educación by Currie-Knight, Kevin
Kevin CURRIE-KNIGHT 
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
II Época, Nº 6 (2011):63-72                                                                                                     
 
63
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The [Other] Half of Knowledge”: 
John Dewey, Michael Oakeshott, 
and Parallel Critiques of 
Rationalism in Education 
 
“La [otra] mitad del conocimiento”: John Dewey, 
Michael Oakeshott y críticas paralelas del 
racionalismo en educación 
 
 
Kevin CURRIE-KNIGHT
1
 
 
 
Recibido: 15/11/2010 
Aprobado: 08/01/2011 
 
 
Resumen: 
 
En este ensayo, mantengo que a pesar de las muchas diferencias que existen entre 
Michael Oakeshott y John Dewey, los dos pensadores ofrecen visiones muy similares de 
cómo debería funcionar la educación. Por medio de sus críticas paralelas al racionalismo, 
ambos pensadores defendieron métodos similares de educación activa. Las similares 
visiones que Dewey y Oakeshott tenían sobre la educación, complejiza dos asociaciones 
que se escuchan a menudo: que los métodos de la pedagogía activa se relacionan 
exclusivamente con las políticas de la izquierda, y que la educación liberal tiene relación 
con el apoyo a una pedagogía pasiva y centrada en el libro. 
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Abstract: 
 
In this paper, I argue that despite the many differences between Michael Oakeshott and 
John Dewey, these two thinkers offer very similar visions of how education should operate. 
By way of their parallel critiques of Rationalism, both thinkers advocated similar methods 
of active education. Dewey and Oakeshott‘s similar educational views complexify two 
often-heard associations: that active pedagogical methods are exclusive with leftward 
political advocacy, and that liberal education correlates with advocacy of passive, book-
centered pedagogy. 
 
Keywords: Rationalism, active pedagogy, judgment, liberal education. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Seldom are the philosophers John Dewey (1859–1952) and Michael Oakeshott (1901–
1990) mentioned together or compared to one another. Where Dewey was a democratic 
socialist, Oakeshott was, depending on the interpreter, either a classical liberal2 or a 
conservative.3 When talking about their philosophies of education, a comparison is equally 
unlikely. John Dewey is much talked about as an important progenitor of progressive and 
child-centered education. Michael Oakeshott, on the other hand, is discussed, when at all, 
as an expositor of a more traditional, subject-centered, liberal education.  
For all of their differences, however, Dewey and Oakeshott shared a very similar view 
of what was wrong with the then-dominant passive models of education, what made these 
models wrong, and the active model they should be replaced with. First, Dewey and 
Oakeshott similarly critique what I will call ―Rationalism‖—the notion that action requires 
only a rote, or near-rote, application of solid rules, derived by reason, to like situations. 
Both thinkers, in describing what it is to act, lay much emphasis on the role of judgment 
(which they both write cannot be broken down into rules).  
From here, both Dewey and Oakeshott write, in different ways and using different 
vocabulary, in support of a constructivist approach to education. Both thinkers stress the 
importance of not only factual knowledge but also knowledge of how to act intelligently 
(requiring judgment) Both philosophers see education as something best done via guided 
practice, for in order for the student to know how to act, she must (if the awkward phrase 
will be excused) practice acting. 
While these two thinkers are rightly seen as opposites in political philosophy, their 
similar advocacies of an active pedagogy is unique because it is sometimes thought that 
such a position tends to be exclusive to a leftward persuasion.4 Conversely, some associate 
the advocacy of a more conservative liberal arts curriculum (which Oakeshott advocated) 
with the advocacy of a passive, book-centered, pedagogy.5  
 
 
2
 Gray, J., Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 40–47. 
3 Rayner, J., The Legend of Oakeshott‘s Conservatism: Sceptical Philosophy and Limited Politics, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, 18(2), 1985, pp. 313–338. 
4
 Because many advocates of progressive educational methods have been of a politically leftward persuasion, 
the pedagogy of active learning has often come to be associated with leftward politics. See, for instance: Ravitch, 
D., Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reform, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2000, pp. 208–238. 
5
 Ravitch, Left Black, op. cit., pp. 284–322. 
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It should be noted that the goal of this paper is to compare (and to some degree, explain) 
elements of Dewey‘s and Oakeshott‘s philosophies, rather than defend them. In this paper, I 
approach the philosophies sympathetically, rather than critically, in order to understand 
them and their relation to eachother.  
 
2. Key Differences Between Dewey and Oakeshott 
 
As mentioned, what makes some of the parellels between Dewey and Oakeshott 
surprising is the fact that their philosophies – particularly social and political – are so 
different. Before entering into anyalysis of the pedagogical similarities between Dewey and 
Oakeshott, it may be instructive to briefly review several of the important differences 
between them.  
First, in reading the works of Dewey and Oakeshott, one notices an overall difference in 
tempermant. Dewey‘s work often exhibits great enthusiasm for the scientific method and an 
optimism toward change and flux.6 In line with much political progressivism at the turn of 
the 20th century, Dewey sought to apply the scientific method to pressing social problems of 
the day in order that society could be improved via intelligent piecemeal reform.7  
Oakeshott, on the other hand, illustrates a conservative tempermant that ―delight[s] in 
what is present rather than what was or what may be.‖8 While Oakeshott recognizes the 
need for change and flux, his work is generally more pessimistic than Dewey‘s with regard 
to the potential for reform efforts to lead to social improvement.  
This difference in temperment manifests itself in very different political visions. In 
books like Individualism Old and New,9 Dewey argued for a social order containing 
elements of democratic socialism. Dewey argued that the ―old,‖ laissez-faire form of 
individualism was too atomistic and needed to be supplemented by a recognition of social 
interconnectedness. Dewey‘s political order sought to foster a democratic 
interconnectedness amongst the polity.  
The ―old‖ individualism that Dewey objected to is, to some degree, found in Oakeshott. 
Essays like ―The Masses in Representative Democracy‖ and ―The Political Economy of 
Freedom‖10 make clear not only Oakeshott‘s methodological individualism, but his overall 
antipathy to political collectivism of the kind Dewey endorsed. 
Lastly, Dewey and Oakeshott‘s divurgent political temperments led to very different 
views toward the school‘s proper relation to society. Dewey‘s writings advocate that 
schools be used democratically as institutions that prepare students to help solve pressing 
social problems.11 Oakeshott advocated that schools not concern themselves with current 
social problems, but to teach students to ―becom[e] aware of a so-called cultural 
inheritance‖ in order to ―understand some of its specific invitations.‖12 In other words, 
where Dewey wanted schools to be an engine of social cohesion by fostering students who 
could think about current social problems, Oakeshott saw schools as engines of individuals 
whose individualilty was based on a solid understanding of the past.  
 
 
6
 See, for instance: Dewey, J., The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary 
Thought, New York, Henry Holt, 1910. 
7
 Ryan, A., John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1997 
8
 Oakeshott, M., Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1991. 
9
 Dewey, J., Individualism Old and New, Amherst, Prometheus Books, 1999 
10
 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., pp. 363-407 
11
 Dewey, J., Democracy and Education [EPUB edition], Salt Lake City, Gutenberg Project E-books, 2008. 
12
 Oakeshott, M., The Voice of Liberal Learning, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2001, p. 17. 
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3. Dewey and Oakeshott as Critics of Rationalism 
 
While Dewey and Oakeshott exhibited marked differences in social and political 
temperment, their divurgent philosophies are undergirded by very similar critiques of 
Rationalism. Dewey devoted two books—Reconstruction in Philosophy13 and The Quest 
for Certainty14—to critiquing the rationalistic tendencies of his predecessors. Oakeshott‘s 
most popular essay—―Rationalism in Politics‖15—is devoted to critiquing Rationalism, 
which he devoted several other essays to as well. This common critique of Rationalism is 
important for understanding both thinkers views on why education must be an active 
process of student participation rather than a passive process of facts and rules conveyed 
from active teacher to passive student.  
By Rationalism, both thinkers meant very similar things: the tendency to view Reason 
as a fixed and exalted thing that, when applied to concrete affairs, obviates the need for 
improvisational or in-the-act judgment or discretion. For Dewey, the rationalistic tendency 
of the philosopher leads her to ―produce an overdeveloped attachment to system for its own 
sake, and an over-pretentious claim to certainty.‖16 Dewey lamented that so much 
philosophy had ―arrogated to itself the office of demonstrating the existence of a 
transcendent, absolute or inner reality and of revealing to man the nature and feature of this 
ultimate and higher reality.‖17  
Likewise, Oakeshott describes the Rationalist thus: ―At bottom, he stands (he always 
stands) for independence of mind on all occasions, for thought free from obligation to any 
authority save the authority of ‗reason.‘ . . . Moreover, he is fortified by a belief in a 
‗reason‘ common to all mankind, a common power of rational consideration, which is the 
ground and inspiration of argument.‖18   
For both authors, then, Rationalism is the quest for a philosophical system of Reason 
that stands above (or can be formulated without appeal to) context.19 For Dewey,  
Ratioanlism could best be seen in Platonistic philosophers like Spinoza (and to some degree 
Kant), in their arguments that ―that ultimate reality [decipherable by reason] is the measure 
of perfection and the norm for human activity.‖20 For Oakeshott, the Rationalist is best seen 
in the philosopher of the enlightenment, who holds things like natural rights, supposed 
―laws‖ of human progress, and other a priori abstract principles to somehow ―exist‖ (rather 
than being historically contingent ideas emerging as a product of human interactions).21 For 
both Dewey and Oakeshott, then, Rationalism was an adherence to the belief that there is a 
rational order that transcends contingency and context, and that this is discoverable by a 
priori reason.22  
 
13
 Dewey, J., Reconstruction in Philosophy, New York, Henry Holt, 1920. 
14
 Dewey, J., The Quest for Certainty, New York: Minton, Balch, 1929. 
15
 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit. 
16
 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 21. Oakeshott also suggests that Rationalism‘s appeal is 
―its appearance of both beginning and ending with certainty.‖ Oakeshott, Ratioalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 17.  
17
 Oakeshott, Ratioalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 23. 
18
 Oakeshott, Ratioalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 8. 
19
 Dewey‘s Rationallist is committed to demonstrating a ―transcendent‖ reality; Oakeshott‘s Rationalist 
―always stands‖ for reason free from context. Both of these imply that the Ratioalist quests for something above 
human context.  
20
 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 54 
21
 Tseng, R., The Sceptical Idealist: Michael Oakesott as a Critic of the Enlightenment, Thorverton, Imprint 
Academic, 2003.  
22
 There are, to be sure, differences between Dewey‘s and Oakeshott‘s portrait of Rationalism, such as 
Dewey‘s suggestion that the Rationalist is unjustly bound to tradition where Oakeshott suggests that the 
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Dewey‘s above-cited books both aim to convince readers that reason is fully human; 
neither certainty nor fixity can arise from the use of reason because humans are neither 
omnicompitent nor static. Since this is so, viewing reason as a faculty somehow immune 
from or above context (which imperfect humans can channel but is not itself imperfect) is a 
fallacy. Instead, seeing reason as a human tool that provides ―[c]oncrete suggestions arising 
from past experience, developed and matured in the light of needs and deficiencies of the 
present, employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction, and tested by success or 
failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment, [must] suffice.‖23 In other words, reason 
may give us suggestions on how to act based on past experience, but it does not obviate the 
need for intelligence in employment or judgment and modification in light of consequences.  
Already, we can see that Dewey is very cognizant of the large role of human judgment 
in human conduct and that this account is wholly missing from the Rationalist conception 
of how reason operates. Oakeshott is even more explicit in this recognition. He suggests 
that there are two kinds of knowledge involved in human action:  
―The first sort of knowledge I will call technical knowledge or knowledge of technique. In 
every art and science, and in every practical activity, a technique is involved. In many activities 
this technical knowedge is formulated into rules which are, or may be, deliberately learned, 
remembered, and as we say, put into practice; but whether or not it is, or has been, precisely 
formulated, its chief characteristic is that it is susceptible of precise formulation. . . . The second 
sort of knowledge I will call practical, because it exists only in use, is not reflective and (unlike 
technique) cannot be formulated in rules. This does not mean, however, that it is an esoteric sort 
of knowledge. It only means that the method by which it may be shared and becomes common 
knowledge is not the method of formulated doctrine‖24. 
 
For Oakeshott, all activity involves both technical and practical knowledge. When 
driving a car, we utilize the technical knowledge of how (mechanically) to handle the car 
and abide by the rules of the road, and the practical knowledge of judging when to merge 
into the next lane, predict the actions of other drivers, and use observation and 
remembrance of past experience to keep alert for dangers. The former can be taught (by 
reading a driver‘s manual or learning how to handle the vehicle). The latter, however, is a 
matter of practical knowledge—knowledge gained by acquiring judgment that cannot be 
reduced to a set of fixed rules, but must be, to at least some degree, improvised.  
Oakeshott writes of practical knowledge as distinct from technical knowledge in the fact 
that ―the method by which it may be shared and becomes common knowledge is not the 
method of formulated doctrine.‖25 How is it shared? Practical knowledge can only be 
shared by observation and experience. In order to acquire and hone the kind of knowledge 
that allows judgment in action, one must observe others acting and practice acting oneself.26 
Practical knowledge is the kind of ―tacit‖ knowledge acquired from human experience that 
has not been reduced to a formula. One should, of course, study examples of judgments that 
have been made in the past (this is where the study of history, philosophy, science, and the 
like comes in), but, in the end, one must also see concrete examples of judgment being 
applied to real situations and practice judging in real situations. 
 
 
Rationalist is not attuned enough to tradition.  These differences, while certainly interesting, are beyond the scope 
of the present article. Here, we will focus only on the similarities in the two thinkers‘ conception of Rationalism.   
23
 Dewey, Recontruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 95. 
24
 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 12. 
25
 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 95 
26
 Oakeshott is not suggesting that one cannot act until one observes others acting (for to observe is itself an 
act). Rather, acting gets better through observation of experienced actors and subsequent guided practice.  
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Oakeshott goes on to write, ―Rationalism is the assertion that what I have called 
practical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion that, properly speaking, there is 
no knowledge which is not technical knowledge.‖27 Why would the rationalist miss the 
existence and necessity of practical knowledge? Because she seeks guidance in Reason of a 
kind thought to be unfettered by contextualized, prejudiced, mundane, and difficult to 
unqualifiedly generalize as human experience. ―The heart of the matter,‖ wrote Oakeshott, 
―is the pre-occupation of the Rationalist with certainty.‖28 
Here, the parallel with Dewey becomes very clear. Dewey also explains the Rationalist‘s 
motive as a quest for certainty and explainable thus: ―Man‘s distrust of himself has caused 
him to desire to get beyond and above himself; in pure knowledge he has thought he could 
attain this self-transcendence.‖29 For both thinkers, Rationalists were Rationalists because 
they saw reason as something that could be free from human imperfection and fallibility. 
It should be stressed that neither Dewey nor Oakeshott are skeptical of reason itself. 
Dewey, the pragmatist, sees reason as a human-made tool that, however fallible and 
contextual, helps humans act in ways that help them attain their ends. Oakeshott, as we 
have seen, does not deny that technical knowledge is a kind of knowledge or that it is 
necessary for action. Rather, both Dewey and Oakeshott argue against a misconstrual of 
what reasoning and acting entail: they entail practical judgment every bit as much as 
abstract rules.  
Dewey and Oakeshott do disagree when speculating as to what motivates the 
Rationalist. Dewey argues that Rationalism stems from attempts of classical conservative 
philosophers to exposit a ―rational justification of things that had been previously accepted 
because of their emotional congeniality and social prestige.‖30 Oakeshott argues quite the 
opposite: that the Rationalist looks to reason in order to liberate humans from tradition: 
―Much of his political activity consists in bringing the social, political, legal, and 
institutional inheritance of his society before the tribunal of his intellect: and the rest is 
rational administration.‖31 
Likely, this has to do with the difference in Dewey‘s and Oakeshott‘s political 
temperaments. Dewey‘s philosophy is shot through with the idea of change and flux, and he 
viewed Rationalism as the obstacle to it. Oakeshott, on the other hand, expressed (in his 
essay ―On Being Conservative‖) a ―prefer[ence for] the familiar to the unfamiliar . . . the 
tried to the untried.‖32  
Whatever their disagreements, Dewey and Oakeshott agreed that Rationalism is an 
obstacle to action because it discounts the necessity of human judgment in the equation. 
Human judgment, being an example of practical knowledge, is not the kind of knowledge 
that can be taught by learning or divining rules, but must be learned through observation 
and practice. This greatly influences their views on education, and particularly their equal 
distaste for passive, rather than active, learning.  
 
 
 
 
 
27 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 15. 
28
 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 16. 
29
 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 7. 
30
 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 20. 
31
 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 8. 
32
 Ibid., p. 408. 
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4. Critique of Rationalism as Critique of Educational Trends 
 
For both Dewey and Oakeshott, the proper aim of education is to produce the ability to 
act intelligently, which requires guided practice. For both thinkers, this involves the 
integration of both information (Oakeshott‘s technical knowledge) and judgment 
(Oakeshott‘s practical knowledge). Both thinkers were highly critical of education that 
failed to cultivate both of these types of knowledge, and both reserved their strongest 
criticism for systems of education of a Rationalist sort—those that confused ―education‖ 
with ―the imparting of technical knowledge.‖ 
It is precisely this confusion that leads Dewey to reject traditional methods of education. 
For him, education is about producing experiences in the child that induce growth and 
hopefully lead to future growth-inducing experiences. Consequently, ―[a]ny experience is 
mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience.‖ 
Growth, for Dewey, is much more than the knowing of a new fact or thing that one did not 
know before. ―An experience may increase a person‘s automatic skill in a particular 
direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut.‖33 
An important part of what Dewey recognizes as ―educative experience‖ was that it 
cultivates a habit of reflective judgment. For Dewey, the problem with ―traditional‖ 
methods of education was not that they didn‘t provide experience for students, but that ―the 
experiences which were had, by pupils and teachers alike, were largely of a wrong kind.‖34 
―How many [students] acquired special skills,‖ Dewey asks rhetorically, ―by means of 
automatic drill so that their powers of judgment and capacity to act intelligently in new 
situations was limited‖?35 Thus, ―traditional‖ education is capable of producing experience 
that could nurture students‘ technical knowledge, but often neglected creating experience 
that nurtured practical knowledge.  
Interestingly, Dewey also criticizes progressive education along similar lines. As the 
teacher‘s job is to create experiences that would lead students to grow, Dewey warns 
progressive educators about the dangers of unstructured experience. Judgment, after all, is a 
skill that must be cultivated, and lack of structure leaves judgment equally undeveloped as a 
structure that emphasizes only technical knowledge.36 
Oakeshott is equally hard on visions of education that put focus only, or mainly, on the 
acquisition of technical knowledge. Even though Oakeshott is often seen as a conservative, 
he is no friend to traditional ―bookish‖ methods of education—education that focuses only 
or primarily on ―the half of knowledge which can be learnt from books when they are used 
as cribs.‖37 As with Dewey, teaching fact and technique may be education of a certain 
limited kind but ―[w]hat is required in addition to information is knowledge which enables 
us to interpret it, to decide upon its relevance, to recognize what rules to apply and to 
discover what action permitted by the rules should, in the circumstances, be performed.‖38 
 
5. Critiquing Rationalism Leads to Advocacy of Active Pedagogical Methods 
 
If judgment, or practical activity, is a necessary part of education, and if it is a part that 
can‘t be reduced to articulable rules and formulae, how does it get taught? How does 
something that cannot be conveyed by symbolic representation get passed from teacher to 
 
33
 Dewey, J., Experience and Education [Sony EPUB Edition],. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1983, p. 19. 
34
 Ibid., p. 20. 
35
 Idem. 
36
 Ibid., p. 49. 
37
 Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, op. cit., p. 38. 
38
 Oakeshott, The Voice of Liberal Learning, op. cit., p. 50. 
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student? As both Dewey and Oakeshott recognize that cultivating judgment is an essential 
component of a good education, they both see the need for education to be active – for it to 
afford students opportunities to practice acting. While one can learn facts in a passive 
fashion, this is not the case for judgment. Judgment must be learned, or refined, only by 
watching examples of others employing judgment and practicing one‘s own judgment. This, 
however, is an active process: it requires an active engagement because it requires 
reflection on what one has seen and immersion in similar activity. 
Is it circular, though, to say that judgment can only be learned or refined by engaging in 
acts of judgment? Doesn‘t a thing have to be learned before it can be engaged in? This is 
not circular for Dewey, who sees the faculty of judgment as one of several ―native 
capacities‖ that school cannot create, but can only nurture, in students.39 To Dewey, it 
would have been erroneous to suggest that we can have any experience without exercising 
judgment. When we see a wagon, for instance, we do not simply see the raw sensation, but 
we use judgment to recognize it as a wagon, rather than as a mess of sense data. When see 
an event, we do not just see the raw sense data, but we construct a story to explain what that 
data is. Judgment, in other words, is a native capacity that humans use automatically. 40  
Even though judgment is a native faculty, Dewey stresses that this faculty needs to be 
cultivated and can be cultivated through guided practice. The more it is worked on in 
school, the more refined the ability to employ judgment becomes. This is one reason 
Dewey stressed the use in school of real, or authentic, problems designed to get students 
actively thinking. This way, students acquire not only factual and technical knowledge but 
also a strong ability to employ judgment.  
―As a consequence of the absence of the materials and occupations which generate real problems, 
the pupil's problems are not his; or, rather, they are his only as a pupil, not as a human being. . .  
The type of judgment formed by these devices is not a desirable addition to character.  If these 
statements give too highly colored a picture of usual school methods, the exaggeration may at 
least serve to illustrate the point: the need of active pursuits, involving the use of material to 
accomplish purposes, if there are to be situations which normally generate problems occasioning 
thoughtful inquiry‖41. 
 
Simply put, an individual can learn to improve thinking only by thinking. One can only 
teach thinking by getting students to actively think. Learning is an active process, and 
activity is made all the more necessary because, as we‘ve seen earlier, Dewey, like 
Oakeshott, believed that learning to think is not reducible to teaching a set of rules. It must 
be engaged in to be understood.  
While Dewey‘s advocacy of active learning in order to sharpen judgment is well known, 
some may be surprised to hear Oakeshott put in this category. Oakeshott carries a reputation 
of a conservative, and it is often tempting to believe he is a defender of the ―traditional‖ 
methods of education that Dewey rejected. A closer look, though, shows us that Oakeshott 
hinted strongly at a belief in active learning. Oakeshott very firmly believed that education 
should lead to not just the ability to know but also the ability to understand, think about, 
and do. All of these things require judgment and all of them, for Oakeshott, required active 
participation and activity.  
 
 
 
 
39
 Dewey, Experience and Education, op. cit., p. 36. 
40
 Dewey, Democracy and Education, op. cit., pp. 115–116. 
41
 Ibid., p. 126, italics added. 
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The importance of engagement in activity for Oakeshott‘s theory of education stemmed 
from his recognition of the mind as inseparable from the knowledge that constitutes it.  
―You do not first have a mind, which acquires a filling of ideas and then makes distinctions 
between true and false, right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable, and then, as a third step, 
causes activity. Properly speaking the mind has no existence apart form or in advance of these and 
other acquisitions‖42. 
 
Like Dewey‘s view that all experience involves thinking and judgment, Oakeshott sees 
mental activity not as something apart from experience, but as something that is inseparable 
from experience. Thinking—the ―mak[ing of] distinctions between true, and false,‖ etc.—is 
a natural part of experience. As such, the learning of judgment, for Oakeshott, required 
active methods of instruction similar to those advocated by Dewey that demand activity on 
the part of the student. 
―[W]e are apt to believe that in order to teach an activity it is necessary to have converted our 
knowledge if it into a set of propositions . . . and that in order to learn an activity we must begin 
with such propositions. It would be foolish, of course, to deny that this device has a pedagogical 
value. But it must be observed that, not only are these rules, etc., these propositions about the 
activity, an abridgment of the teacher‘s concrete knowledge of the activity . . . but learning them 
is never more than the meanest part of education in an activity. . . . To work alongside a practiced 
scientist or craftsman is an opportunity not only to learn the rules, but to acquire also a direct 
knowledge of how he sets about his business . . . and until this is acquired nothing of great value 
has been learned‖43. 
 
As Oakeshott very much believed that the proper end of education was ―education in 
activities‖ (speaking, writing, thinking within various disciplines), the teacher, then, does 
not only impart information but also models conduct and assists the student in practicing 
conduct.44 
We can see, then, that both Dewey and Oakeshott advocated for the kind of education 
that teaches judgment and practice as much as the learning of facts, rules, and technical 
knowledge. Both of them recognized that in order to teach such inarticulable things as 
judgment and practice, something more than Oakeshott‘s above-quoted ―convert[ing] . . . 
knowledge into a set of propositions‖ is needed: the learner cannot learn judgment in the 
same way she learns fact x or rule y. Thus, both Dewey and Oakeshott advocate an active 
learning environment where the learner is immersed into the world of practice as opposed 
to being the passive recipient of knowledge.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Despite their differences in political philosophy, Dewey and Oakeshott maintained very 
similar positions with regards to pedagogy: both were critics of Rationalism; both 
advocated schools that taught students not only information and technical knowledge but 
also judgment and practical knowledge, which led both to critique certain educational 
trends of their day; and both thinkers advocated a type of active learning where the student 
participates in learning by being immersed in the world of practice.  
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I have tried to show not only that these three beliefs were consistent between the two 
thinkers, but also that they are consistent among themselves. That is, a critique of 
Rationalism that sees error in stripping reason of contextual judgment as its aid is exactly 
the type of starting point that would lead one to criticize the educational institutions that 
one believes operate with, and perhaps perpetuate, this error. Likewise, if one believes that 
schools should teach judgment and practice as well as facts and rules, one may very well go 
on to advocate a type of active learning where students must learn these types of things 
(which are not as articulable as facts and rules, and often need to be learned by immersion 
in practice).  
Despite these similarities, Dewey and Oakeshott still came to different conclusions 
about the most appropriate curriculum. Dewey championed progressive education, while 
Oakeshott advocated liberal education. If Dewey and Oakeshott agreed on the importance 
of moving beyond a Rationalistic approach in the schools and active pedagogical methods, 
then why do they wind up with divergent conceptions of what children should learn 
(academically speaking)?  
Oakeshott was a self-proclaimed conservative in temperament who wrote that the 
primary business of schools is to educate students into their cultural inheritance—to equip 
them with the languages created by their forebears so that they can participate in life. 
Dewey, by contrast, was a democratic socialist who believed that the schools should equip 
students with the ability to deal with or solve the social problems that would confront them 
when they graduated.  
Thus the differences between Dewey and Oakeshott were over curricular, rather than 
pedagogical, concerns. This is interesting because it is often thought that liberal and 
progressive education are pedagogically incompatible. By way of curriculum, this may be 
true curricularly, as progressive education stresses a curriculum determined by relevance to 
the individual and her environment. Liberal education, on the other hand, tends to stress a 
―cultural literacy‖ curriculum that, as Oakeshott writes, initiates the individual into her 
cultural inheritance. The former, concerned with the present and future, often stresses 
change, where the latter, concerned with learning from the past and present, tends to stress 
continuity. But as this paper hopefully shows, there need not be disagreement between 
progressive and liberal education over what types of knowledge schools teach (facts and 
technique or judgment and practice) or on the pedagogical model best suited to teach those 
types of knowledge (passive or active). In the age of standardization and increased reliance 
on standardized tests45, recognizing that two very distinct thinkers—―progressive‖ Dewey 
and ―conservative‖ Oakeshott—stood together in advocating that schools teach students to 
think and act via active engagement, rather than passive conveyance of Rationalistic 
information, should not be overlooked.  
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 It has often been argued that increasing standardized testing increases reliance on (to use Oakeshott‘s term) 
technical knowledge. This, in turn, leads teachers to use more teacher-centered methods of instruction. See, for 
instance: Jones, M. G., Jones, B. D., and Hargrove, T., The Unintended Consequences of High-Stakes Testing, 
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
